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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has had a difficult time resolving First
Amendment disputes in the public school setting. The Court has
frequently reiterated that teachers and students do not “shed their
Constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”1 Nonetheless, schools must be able to maintain
some control over their classrooms because “[i]n no activity of the
State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools.”2
Not surprisingly, lower courts have had trouble navigating these
conflicting interests, and as a result, this area of the law can be quite
difficult to predict.3

∗

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S. Mathematics, May 2005, University of Texas-Austin. I would like
to acknowledge Professor Hal Morris, Julia Lissner, Matthew McQuiston and Tracy
Mendonides for their invaluable help in writing this Note.
1
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
3
See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4-6 (2001).
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In Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corp., the
Seventh Circuit recently scaled back the protection afforded to the
classroom speech of public school teachers.4 A school dismissed a
teacher, after she mentioned to her students that she honked her horn
while driving past individuals protesting the war in Iraq.5 The court
ruled that teachers’ opinions are not protected by the First Amendment
when expressed in the classroom.6 This decision implicitly overruled
previous precedent by applying a stricter test to teacher classroom
speech.7
Federal courts are currently split over what test to apply when
evaluating a teacher’s classroom speech. The First, Second, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits8 treat this speech as classroom speech governed by
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.9 The Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, D.C., and now Seventh Circuits10 treat this speech as public
employee speech governed by Pickering v. Board of Education of
Township High School District 205.11 The Supreme Court has not yet

4

(Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, Mayer v.
Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 06-1993, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7157 (7th
Cir. Mar. 12, 2007).
5
Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 478.
6
Id. at 480.
7
See, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008
(7th Cir. 1990).
8
See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719,
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991).
9
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
10
See Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 478; Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270
F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001); Boring v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364,
372-73 (4th Cir. 1998); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d
Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989);
Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Some of these
decisions do not cite directly to Pickering. Rather, they cite to some other case in
that line such as Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
11
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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resolved this split—although it could have addressed the issue in its
recent decision Garcetti v. Ceballos.12
Despite the controversy surrounding this issue, the Seventh
Circuit has not explained why it prefers one test over the other. This
Note will attempt to fill that gap. Part I will explain how a circuit split
has developed around these three Supreme Court decisions. Part II will
explain what the Seventh Circuit has contributed to this debate with
Mayer. Part III will examine practical problems created by Mayer. Part
IV will analyze the various tests that the Seventh Circuit could have
applied in Mayer. Finally, Part V will argue that the court should have
maintained its earlier practice of evaluating teacher classroom speech
under Hazelwood.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Precedents
When analyzing teacher classroom speech, courts must choose
between two different lines of Supreme Court precedent. The first
focuses on public employee speech, and the second focuses on school
speech.
1. The Pickering Line of Cases
In Pickering, a public high school teacher wrote a letter to the
local newspaper opposing a bond proposal to raise school funds.13 The
letter accused the school board of diverting too much money to
athletics and threatening teachers who opposed the bond proposal.14
After the school board fired the teacher, he filed a § 1983 action
against the school board claiming that his First Amendment right to
expression had been infringed.15 The Supreme Court explained that
12

126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 564-65.
13
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government employees do not lose their Constitutional rights simply
by accepting government paychecks.16 Nonetheless, the government
needs some control over the speech of its employees to promote the
efficiency of public services.17
The Supreme Court developed a two part test two resolve this
tension: (1) a court must determine whether a public employee’s
speech touches upon “matters of public concern;” (2) if so, the court
must balance the free speech interests of the employee against the
government’s interest as an employer.18 If the speech does not touch
on a matter of public concern it is unprotected, and the employee’s
claim will fail.19
The bond issue in Pickering was the subject of considerable
public debate at the time, so the Court moved on to the second part of
the test, balancing the interests of the teacher and the school board.
The teacher had an interest in contributing his opinion to the public
debate, and the public had an interest in receiving as much information
as possible regarding this important decision.20 The school board, on
the other hand, suffered no detriment because of the letter. It was
written after the proposal had been defeated at the polls and, as far as
the Court could tell, the public greeted it with “massive apathy and
total disbelief.”21 Since the school board brought forth no evidence
that the letter created any disruption, or hindered the school’s attempt
to raise funds, the teacher’s speech was protected.22 Accordingly, he
had been wrongfully discharged.23
Subsequent decisions have clarified this complicated test. For
example, the government may still retaliate against the protected
16

See id. at 568.
Id.
18
See id. at 572-73. This second step is commonly referred to as the “Pickering
balancing test.”
19
Id.
20
Id. at 571-72.
21
Id. at 570.
22
Id. at 572-73.
23
Id. at 574-75.
17
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speech of a public employee if it has an independent basis for
discharge.24 In addition, the speech need not be broadcast to the
public; speech directed only toward supervisors may also be
protected.25
The Supreme Court’s next major decision in this area, Connick v.
Myers,26 narrowed the definition of “public concern.”27 An assistant
district attorney was upset about being transferred to a different
division. She circulated a questionnaire soliciting the views of her
colleagues concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the level of
confidence in supervisors, and whether they felt pressured to work in
political campaigns.28 The trial court had held that this questionnaire
addressed matters of public concern, but the Supreme Court
reversed.29 After considering the “content, form, and context” of the
employee’s speech, the Supreme Court concluded that the
questionnaire was an outgrowth of a personal dispute.30 Although it
addressed matters of public concern, the purpose of the questionnaire
was simply to frustrate her supervisors.31 The Court refused to
“constitutionalize” this employee grievance to discourage public
employees from litigating minor personal disputes.32 Because Myers
could not pass the first step of the Pickering test, the Court did not
address the second step.33
24

See Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1976)
(explaining that the school board could not fire a teacher for distributing a memo to a
local radio station, but it could fire him for obscene conduct directed toward faculty,
staff, and students).
25
Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979)
(explaining that private speech between teacher and principal may be protected after
the teacher criticized the school’s implementation of a desegregation order).
26
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
27
See Daly, supra note 3, at 9.
28
Connick, 461 U.S. at 141-42.
29
Id. at 152.
30
Id. at 148.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 154.
33
See id.
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Most recently, in Garcetti, the Supreme Court further narrowed
the first step of the Pickering test.34 A deputy district attorney
examined an affidavit used to procure a search warrant.35 He wrote a
memo to his supervisor detailing serious misrepresentations made in
the affidavit, but his supervisor refused to dismiss the case.36 After a
heated discussion of this decision, the deputy was transferred to a
different division; in response, the deputy sued.37 The Court ruled that
although the memo touched upon matters of public concern, it was not
protected because it was written pursuant to the employee’s duty as a
calendar deputy.38 When a government employee is speaking within
the scope of his employment duties, he is not speaking as a citizen,
and hence has no First Amendment protection.39
In light of Connick and Garcetti, a government employee must
now satisfy a new test to prevail on a First Amendment claim. The
employee must show that (1) the speech, considered in context,40
touches upon “matters of public concern,” and is outside the scope of
employment;41 (2) if so, the free speech interests of the employee must
outweigh government’s interest as an employer.42 Although the
language of Garcetti is broad enough to apply to all public employees,
the Court explicitly declined to decide if this same test applies to cases
involving “speech related to scholarship or teaching.”43

34

See Krystal LoPilato, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First
Amendment Protection for Speech Within Their Job Duties, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 537 (2006).
35
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
36
Id. at 1955.
37
Id. at 1956.
38
Id. at 1960.
39
Id.
40
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
41
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1962.
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2. The Hazelwood Line of Cases
The Supreme Court has consistently applied specialized analysis
for speech occurring in school settings.44 The seminal case on school
speech is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, in which the Court protected students’ right to wear black
armbands protesting the Vietnam War.45 Justice Fortas famously
proclaimed “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.”46 School authorities may censor classroom
speech, but only after showing that the speech would “‘materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school.’”47
Tinker was a first attempt at balancing free speech rights against
the practical need to maintain discipline in an educational institution.
The Court’s strong rhetoric against authoritarian limits on teacher and
student expression encouraged lower courts to protect First
Amendment rights in schools.48
Subsequent decisions have tipped the scales further in favor of
school authorities.49 For example, the Court elaborated in Bethel v.
Fraser that a school may prevent a student from giving an obscene
speech, and emphasized a school’s need to disassociate itself from
inappropriate speech.50

44

See Frederick Schauer, The Thirteenth Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference
On Constitutional Law: Horowitz, Churchill, Columbia—What Next For Academic
Freedom?: Is There A Right To Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 90809 (2006).
45
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
46
Id. at 506.
47
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
48
See id. (“[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism”).
49
See Daly, supra note 3, at 9.
50
478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
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The Supreme Court’s most recent decision in this line,
Hazelwood, significantly narrowed the holding in Tinker.51 In
Hazelwood, a high school principal removed several controversial
articles from the student-written school newspaper.52 One article was
removed because it discussed students’ experiences with pregnancy,
and the principal worried that the article did not sufficiently conceal
the students’ identities. The other article criticized a student’s father
during divorce proceedings without giving the father a chance to
explain his behavior.53
Rather than simply applying the Tinker test, the Court used
“forum analysis” to determine what test to apply.54 The Court first
considered whether the school had opened up the newspaper as a
public forum; if so, it would apply the Tinker test.55 It concluded that
because the school reserved editorial control over the newspaper, it
was a non-public forum for “school-sponsored” expression.56 It
determined that a new test was necessary for this speech which “the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.”57
The new test allowed the school to censor school-sponsored
speech so long as its actions are “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”58 The Court found that the school board had a
legitimate interest in teaching appropriate journalism practice, i.e.
protecting confidentiality of sources and allowing for even-handed
debate. Because the articles deviated from that practice, the principal
did not violate the First Amendment by removing them from the
51

See Daly, supra note 3, at 11.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 267. The Court had recently elaborated on this concept of
differentiating between First Amendment claims based on the forum of the speech.
See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
55
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73.
56
Id. at 270.
57
Id. at 271.
58
Id. at 273.
52
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school newspaper.59 The Court further explained that school
authorities have a legitimate pedagogical interest in protecting students
from speech that advocates drug use, irresponsible sex or conduct
“inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order.’”60
Although Hazelwood dealt with student speech, the test the Court
articulated is broad enough to include teacher speech which is schoolsponsored.61 Accordingly, lower courts have disagreed over whether
teacher classroom speech should be analyzed as government employee
speech under Pickering, or school sponsored speech under
Hazelwood.62
B. Circuit Court Responses
Although few courts have had the chance to address Garcetti, the
Hazelwood/Pickering distinction has provided ample ground for
disagreement between the circuits.63 Both lines of cases provide
different tests for evaluating teacher classroom speech. Pickering
protects teacher classroom speech that addresses matters of public
concern.64 Hazelwood protects teacher classroom speech when the
school board has no legitimate pedagogical reason for preventing the
speech.65 These two very different tests do not always return the same
results.66 While most circuits have decided to apply one test or the
other, few have explained why.67
59

Id. at 272.
Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
61
See Daly, supra note 3, at 62; Walter E. Kuhn, First Amendment Protection
of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE L.J. 995, 1024 (2006).
62
See Daly, supra note 3, at 16.
63
See Daly, supra note 3, at 16-17.
64
See 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).
65
See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
66
See Daly, supra note 3, at 16-17. For example, suppose a math teacher asks
students to identify practical uses for algebra in their everyday lives. Certainly there
is a pedagogical reason for this assignment, but it does not touch upon matters of
public concern. Alternatively, suppose that math teacher decides to discuss the war
in Iraq instead of math. While this topic is a matter of public concern, the math
60
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1. Circuit Courts that Apply Pickering
At least two courts applying Pickering have determined
categorically that classroom speech is never protected.68 In Boring v.
Buncombe, a drama teacher directed a school play which the school
principal felt violated the controversial materials policy.69 Although he
initially approved the play, the principal later decided that the play was
inappropriate. At the end of the year he requested that the teacher be
transferred because of “personal conflicts.”70 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that disputes over classroom speech are inherently private
employment disputes.71 Thus, classroom speech never touches upon
matters of public concern.72 This ruling effectively created a per se
rule that teacher classroom speech is unprotected. While this decision
creates a clear rule, it did not properly analyze whether the teacher’s
speech touched upon matters of public concern.73
The Sixth Circuit applied the Pickering test more faithfully in
Cockrel v. Shelby.74 An elementary school teacher invited Woody
Harrelson to discuss legalization of industrialized hemp in her

teacher would have no legitimate pedagogical reason for refusing to teach math in
math class.
67
See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719,
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd.
of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch.
Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1176-77
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
68
See Boring v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1998);
Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 798.
69
136 F.3d at 366.
70
Id.
71
See id. at 369.
72
See id.
73
See id. at 378-79 (Motz, J. dissenting).
74
270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001).
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classroom.75 The principal initially approved this decision, but after
several visits by the famous actor, national media attention, and
numerous parents’ complaints, the principal fired the teacher.76 The
court applied Pickering and first determined that because the
controversial topic of industrialized hemp generated substantial public
debate, it is a matter of public concern. The court recognized that a
teacher may still speak about matters of public concern within the
classroom, and criticized Boring for focusing on the location of the
speech rather than the content of the speech.77
The court next applied the second step of the Pickering test—
balancing the interests of the employee and the school.78 The court
ruled that the balancing test weighed heavily in favor of the teacher.
The teacher’s speech addressed a matter of significant public concern
and the speech did nothing to hurt the efficiency of the workplace, or
create disharmony among employees. Although several parents
complained, these complaints had minimal impact on workplace
efficiency.79 At least one Judge was particularly influenced by the fact
that the school had initially authorized the visits.80 Thus, under
Pickering, the teacher’s speech was protected.
The Fourth Circuit will likely read Garcetti as validating its
earlier decision because classroom speech is part of a teacher’s official
duties. The Sixth Circuit may join the Fourth Circuit by adopting a per
se rule that teacher classroom speech is unprotected, or it may focus
on Garcetti’s statement that the school setting is unique.81

75

Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1042-45.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1054.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1060 (Siler, J. concurring).
81
See id. at 1962.
76
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2. Circuit Courts that Apply Hazelwood
Courts applying Hazelwood have done so uniformly, i.e. there is
no comparable split like the one between the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. Under Hazelwood, a school may restrict teacher classroom
speech to advance “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”82 Preservation
of the school board’s accepted curriculum is one such concern, so a
teacher has no First Amendment right to deviate from the
curriculum.83 Teacher speech may be protected when it does not
contradict the school’s curriculum.84 Thus, Courts applying
Hazelwood have generally concluded that school boards have wide
latitude to set curricula, but must give teachers adequate notice of
speech restrictions.85
In Ward v. Hickey a ninth grade biology teacher started a
discussion over whether Down’s syndrome fetuses should be
aborted.86 After a parent notified the school board of the discussion,
the board voted to deny the teacher tenure, and he sued. The First
Circuit ruled that the school board had a legitimate pedagogical
interest in prohibiting such a controversial discussion.87 Nonetheless,
the school board could only punish the teacher after notifying him that
such a discussion is prohibited.88 In contrast, courts applying
Pickering are not usually concerned with notice to the teachers.89
82

See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719,
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991); Webster v. New Lenox
Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1990).
83
See Ward, 996 F.2d at 452.
84
See Lacks, 147 F.3d at 723; Ward, 996 F.2d at 454; Webster, 917 F.2d at
1007.
85
See Lacks, 147 F.3d at 723; Ward, 996 F.2d at 452.
86
996 F.2d at 450.
87
Id. at 453.
88
Id. at 452.
89
See Mayer v. Monroe (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007); Boring
v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1998); Bradley v.
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C. The Seventh Circuit Response
The Seventh Circuit initially followed those courts applying
Hazelwood to teacher classroom speech. In Webster v. New Lenox
School District No. 122, a teacher refused to teach evolution and chose
to teach creation science instead.90 Despite complaints from school
authorities, the teacher simply refused to follow the curriculum.91 The
Seventh Circuit analyzed his claim under Hazelwood. Like the other
courts applying Hazelwood, it ruled that a school board has a
legitimate pedagogical interest in ensuring that teachers do not create
their own curricula.92 Accordingly, the teacher had no First
Amendment right to discuss creation science in the classroom.93 While
school authorities may not fire teachers for “random classroom
comments,” they may fire a teacher who refuses to teach the set
curriculum.94
The Seventh Circuit applied Pickering in employment dispute
cases involving non-classroom teacher speech. The court applied this
analysis when a university professor sexually harassed female students
at a conference off campus,95 and when a high school teacher wrote
articles for a local newspaper criticizing the school board.96 In both
those cases the teachers had claimed First Amendment protection for
their speech.97

Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d
1169, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969); but see Cockrel v. Shelby, 270 F.3d 1036, 1060 (6th
Cir. 2001) (Siler, J. concurring).
90
917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990).
91
Id. at 1006.
92
Id. at 1008.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1007-08.
95
See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F. 3d 878, 881-84 (7th Cir. 2003).
96
See Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194 (7th Cir. 1996).
97
Trejo, 319 F. 3d at 884; Dishnow, 77 F.3d at 197.
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The Seventh Circuit recently had an opportunity to re-visit teacher
classroom speech in Piggee v. Sandburg.98 Piggee, a cosmetology
teacher at a community college, placed anti-homosexual pamphlets in
the pocket of one student at the end of class. The student, who was
homosexual, was deeply offended by the pamphlets.99 At the end of
the year, the teacher’s contract was not renewed.100 Ignoring Webster,
the court discussed the first step of the Pickering test—whether or not
the speech touched upon a matter of public concern, and was outside
the scope of her employment.101 The court determined that the
discussion of homosexual behavior “richly deserves public
attention.”102 Furthermore, the speech was outside the scope of
Piggee’s employment because she was hired to teach cosmetology not
proselytize against homosexuality.103 Nonetheless, the court refused to
move onto the second step of the Pickering test.104 Instead, it decided
that the Pickering test was simply inappropriate for teacher classroom
speech. The court described a new test: a school can prohibit
“nongermane” speech that “could impede the school’s educational
mission.”105
This decision is difficult to interpret in light of the circuit split
surrounding this issue. The Seventh Circuit seems to have rejected its
earlier decisions and aligned itself with the circuits that apply
Pickering to cases involving teacher classroom speech. However,
Piggee does not follow Boring v. Buncombe because it refused to

98

See 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 669 (Specifically, he “did not appreciate being called an abomination,
a child molester, or a rapist and a deviant”).
100
Id. at 669.
101
Id. at 670-71.
102
Id. at 671-72.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 672 (“The real question, however, is whether the college had a right to
insist that Piggee refrain from engaging in that particular speech while serving as an
instructor of cosmetology”).
105
Id. at 672. The court offered little explanation of where this test comes
from, and it does not cite to any previous opinion. See id.
99
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create a per se rule that teacher classroom speech is unprotected.106 It
does not follow Cockrel v. Shelby because it refused to move onto the
second step of the Pickering test.107 Although much of the discussion
in Piggee concerns Pickering, the holding of the case is consistent
with the Seventh Circuit’s earlier precedent applying Hazelwood, i.e.
the court required the school to justify its employment decision by
showing some sort of educational concern.108
II. MAYER V. MONROE COUNTY COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORP.
If Piggee left doubts about which line of Supreme Court
precedent to apply in cases involving teacher classroom speech, Mayer
v. Monroe answered them. This decision firmly aligns the Seventh
Circuit with those courts that have created a per se rule that teacher
classroom speech is unprotected.109 The case is very short, and the
compelling story leading up to the litigation is condensed into a
paragraph. Luckily, the district court preserved much of the factual
background.110
A. The District Court Opinion
In August of 2002, Mayer signed a one-year contract with the
Monroe School Board to teach a current events class for fourth-sixth
graders.111 She relied on approved material such as the current events
106

Piggee, 464 F.3d at 671 (“[c]lassroom or instructional speech, in short, is
inevitably speech that is part of the instructor’s official duties, even though at the
same time the instructor’s freedom to express her views on the assigned course is
protected”).
107
Id. at 672.
108
Compare id., with Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d
1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990).
109
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 478
(7th Cir. 2007).
110
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer I), 1:04-CV-1695-SEBVSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *4-*27 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006).
111
Id. at *5 n.1.
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magazine, “Time for Kids” (“TFK”), to teach the class. On January 10,
2003, TFK contained information on the war in Iraq and related
protests.112 After discussing the article, one student asked Ms. Mayer if
she would ever march in a protest. She responded that peace protests
are going on all over the country including Bloomington, and “[w]hen
I drive past the courthouse square and the demonstrators are picketing
I honk my horn for peace because their sign says ‘Honk for Peace.’”113
She further explained that it is important for everyone to seek out
peaceful solutions even on the playground. The class then moved on to
discuss other material.114
Soon afterward, one parent complained and the school principal
held a meeting with the parent and Ms. Mayer. All three agreed that
Ms. Mayer should “not mention peace in her class again.”115 The next
day, the principal circulated a memo to the school teachers informing
everyone that the school had no official stance on the war in Iraq. He
also cancelled “Peace Month,” an annual tradition supporting peaceful
resolution of problems.116 After the school district refused to renew her
contract, Mayer sued.117 The district court engaged in Pickering
analysis and granted summary judgment for the school board after it
determined that Mayer was speaking as a public employee rather than
a citizen.118

112

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6
114
Id. at *6.
115
Id. at *7.
116
Id. at *9.
117
Id. at *26. Although both Mayer I and Mayer II focused on the First
Amendment issue, the district court detailed numerous other complaints against Ms.
Mayer which, if true, could have independently justified her termination. Id. at *9*26. Because Mayer disputed these complaints, the court ignored them at the
summary judgment stage.
118
Id. at *39.
113
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B. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
Less than a month after the district court issued its opinion, the
Supreme Court decided Garcetti, which denies First Amendment
protection to public employees acting pursuant to official duties.119
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that if Garcetti applies then “the school
district prevails without further ado.”120 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion focuses on whether Mayer’s speech occurred pursuant to an
official duty.121
The court first looked at its earlier teacher classroom speech case,
Webster.122 It mentions this case simply for the proposition that
teachers must follow the rules set by school authorities.123 A teacher
must stick to the prescribed curriculum, so a literature teacher cannot
choose what books to teach and a math teacher cannot decide to teach
calculus in place of trigonometry.124 Part of the rationale for this rule is
that teachers can be powerful influences in students’ lives; the power
to decide what students hear must rest in the hands of elected
officials.125 The court concluded that Mayer presented “personal views
to captive audiences against the instructions of elected officials.”126
This comment is unusual because no elected official instructed
Mayer that her comments were outside the curriculum until after she
made them.127 In fact, since she was commenting on approved
material, her comments were likely within the prescribed curriculum.
119

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960-61 (2006).
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 479
(7th Cir. 2007).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 479 (“This is so in part because the school system does not “regulate”
teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech”).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 480.
126
Id.
127
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer I), 1:04-CV-1695-SEBVSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *4-*7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006).
120
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While this point is arguable, the court simply assumes that Mayer
disobeyed school authorities.128
The court next distinguished Piggee by stating that proselytizing
was not part of Piggee’s teaching duties, but Mayer’s current events
class was an assigned task.129 Thus, the court need not apply Piggee’s
“germaneness” test because Garcetti applies directly—Mayer had no
first amendment right to express an opinion on current events in
current events class. The court concluded by holding, “the first
amendment does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when
conducting the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or
advocate viewpoints, that depart from the curriculum adopted by the
school.”130 Although the court qualified its holding by stating that
teacher speech is only proscribed when it departs from the curriculum,
this qualification is meaningless because the court never explained
why Mayer’s comments departed from the curriculum. She covered a
topic adopted in the school curriculum—the Iraq war—and advocated
a position which the school had annually celebrated until the day after
her comments—peaceful resolution of conflicts. Even if Mayer’s
statements did depart from the curriculum, they did so only after the
school informed Mayer that her statements were inappropriate.131
Thus, the Seventh Circuit allows school boards to change the
curriculum post hoc, and then fire a teacher for making comments that
were acceptable at the time they were made.
III. PROBLEMS WITH MAYER V. MONROE COUNTY
COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORP.
The Seventh Circuit has created a per se rule that teachers have no
right to express opinions in the classroom, even if the school board
128

Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 480.
Id.
130
Id.
131
See Mayer I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *37-*38 (stating that it is
irrelevant when the school board prohibited Mayer’s speech because she never had a
First Amendment right to express any opinion in the classroom).
129
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initially approves the opinions. This rule creates numerous practical
problems.132 The court intended that this bright-line rule minimize
costly litigation over employment disputes, and clarify that school
boards, not teachers, control the curriculum.133 Unfortunately, the rule
favors school boards too much: it encourages school boards to bend to
the whims of vocal parents and use teachers as scapegoats; it
discourages teachers from developing creative lesson plans; and it
threatens teachers’ rights outside the classroom.
As Mayer illustrates, school boards are bombarded by constant
pressure from parents.134 While the school board has a responsibility
to respect the wishes of the community, it must do so in a way
consistent with the Constitution.135 For example, a school board
cannot decide to teach creationism instead of evolution simply because
a vocal group of parents complain.136 Similarly, a school board should
not dismiss good teachers simply because a handful of parents have
idiosyncratic objections. Other circuits protect teachers from this sort
of whimsical removal by requiring school boards to offer some sort of

132

See, e.g., Daly, supra note 3, at 28-31 (discussing problems created by the
per se rules of Boring v. Buncombe and similar cases).
133
See Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 478-79.
134
Mayer I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *4-*27; Liz Babiarz, School
Board to study turnover; Board wants to learn why superintendents do not stay,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 2006 at BS1 (noting that community pressure
is one of the primary reasons superintendents have been leaving the local school
board).
135
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“Local School Boards may not remove books
from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those
books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion’”); Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763
F.2d 211, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1985) (rev’d on other grounds by Memphis Cmty. Sch.
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (criticizing a school board for not defending a
teacher against parents protesting the school board’s curriculum).
136
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 (1987).
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justification for their employment decisions.137 In these circuits, school
boards must explain to even the most irate parents that they cannot
arbitrarily remove teachers.138 Under Mayer, teachers no longer have
this protection because a school board can justify any employment
decision by pointing to a teacher’s classroom speech, even if the
speech was pre-approved.139 District courts in these circuits are left
with no choice but to dismiss the teachers’ claims.140
Because pre-approval confers no protection on teachers, Mayer
actually encourages school boards to use teachers as scapegoats when
parents object to classroom speech.141 Suppose a teacher seeks
approval for discussing a certain topic in class, which might upset a
small minority of parents in the community. A principal outside the
Seventh Circuit would have to weigh the educational benefits of the
discussion against the potential parental backlash. If the backlash will
be substantial, the principal will protect the reputation of the school by
disallowing the discussion. In the Seventh Circuit, a principal could
approve the discussion, and then if the parents become upset, the

137

Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001);
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998);
Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir.
1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub.
Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991).
138
See, e.g., Stachura, 763 F.2d at 214-15.
139
See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477,
480 (7th Cir. 2007).
140
Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (D. Va. 2006)
(granting summary judgment to school after applying Boring); Erskine v. Bd. of
Educ., 207 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D. Md. 2002) (dismissing teacher’s claim);
Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d 677, 684 (D. Va. 2000) (refusing to grant
preliminary injunction to keep teacher’s pamphlets available to students).
141
See, e.g., Stachura, 763 F.2d at 214-15; cf. Kara Lynn Grice, Striking an
Unequal Balance: The Fourth Circuit Holds that Public School Teachers Do Not
Have First Amendment Rights to Set Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Education, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1960, 2005-06 (1999) (arguing that excessive
deference granted to school boards destroys the balance between school authorities
and teachers).
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principal could fire the teacher as a scapegoat.142 Even worse, the
school board could fire a teacher who simply taught the prescribed
curriculum, which happens to upset a group of parents.
While this example may seem far-fetched, a few district courts
have already allowed this to happen. In Stachura v. Truszkowski, a
teacher taught a sex education course approved by the principal and
school board.143 After a few parents complained, the school board
suspended the teacher, ignoring the fact that it had created the class. A
district court upheld the school board’s decision, and as a result, the
teacher suffered through years of harassment from the community and
enmity from the national media.144 The Sixth Circuit later reversed the
district court and ruled that the school board could not fire him for
simply doing his job.145 In Erskine v. Board of Education a teacher was
fired for writing the Spanish word for black, “negro,” on the board
during a Spanish lesson on colors.146 A district court in the Fourth
Circuit, reasoned that under, Boring v. Buncombe, the word was a part
of the lesson plan, thus it was per se unprotected speech.147 Teachers in
the Seventh Circuit can now look forward to a similar fate.
While some teachers may feel the sting of Mayer after they have
been fired, most teachers will feel its effects in the classroom. Most
schools encourage teachers to develop creative lesson plans and find
new ways to connect with students.148 Historically, courts have granted
limited protection to these efforts by requiring schools to justify

142

See Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 480.
Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1985) (rev’d on other
grounds by Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)).
144
Stachura, 763 F.2d at 213-14.
145
Id. at 214-15.
146
207 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D. Md. 2002)
147
Id. The court expressed doubt that the teacher was actually dismissed for
this incident, but it assumed the truth of the teacher’s assertion for purposes of
summary judgment. Id. at 409-410.
148
See Magnet School a Family Affair, HERALD & REVIEW, Apr. 3, 2007; Give
Teachers Flexibility, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 28, 2007 at A8.
143
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actions against teachers.149 Because Mayer completely removes this
protection, it strongly discourages teachers from developing creative
teaching methods or even explaining difficult concepts in their own
words.150
Teachers may even experience this chilling effect outside the
classroom.151 Mayer holds that the First Amendment does not protect a
teacher’s speech when the teacher is “conducting the education of
captive audiences.”152 Just when does a teacher stop teaching? May a
teacher express an opinion to students who linger in the classroom
after hours? During lunch break? During a school event such as a
sporting event or reception? While the court need not answer these
questions now, the prospects for teachers do not look promising.153
To some extent, these questions are natural reactions to the
Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision,154 rather than to Mayer. But the
line between personal and professional life is much blurrier for
teachers than for district attorneys.155 Society encourages teachers to
connect with their students and inspire them, and popular culture
celebrates teachers with creative and inspirational methods.

149

Donald F. Uerling, Academic Freedom in K-12 Education, 79 NEB. L. REV.
956, 966 (2000) (listing cases).
150
Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words In The Classroom: Teaching The Limits Of
The First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597, 600 (1999).
151
See Piggee v. Sandburg, 464 F.3d 667, 671 (2006) (explaining that the
instructor/student relationship does not end the moment class is over).
152
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 480
(7th Cir. 2007).
153
See Tracy F. Mendonides, Speak No Evil? The Seventh Circuit Limits
Speech Rights of Government Employees, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 667 (2007), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-2/mendonides.pdf (arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s
broad interpretation of Garcetti threatens the First Amendment rights of public
employees).
154
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1968 (Souter, J. dissenting)
(arguing that the majority opinion invites litigation over whether an employees
comments were made pursuant to official duties).
155
See id. at 1970 (Souter, J. dissenting); Piggee, 464 F.3d at 671.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF TESTS AVAILABLE TO THE MAYER COURT
Mayer ignores several judicial tests that it could have applied.
Besides Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit could have applied traditional
Pickering analysis, Hazelwood analysis, Piggee analysis, or some
other test.
A. The Garcetti Rule
Although Garcetti preserves the opportunity for circuit courts to
apply different tests in the school setting,156 the Seventh Circuit adopts
it without much discussion. The Supreme Court was concerned that
the school setting presents different interests which may require
further analysis,157 but Mayer does not address this concern.
Unfortunately, this concern is well founded because teacher-student
communication is very different from communication between fellow
employees.
Garcetti attempts to resolve a conflict between an employee’s
right to criticize an employer, and the government’s need to operate
effectively and efficiently.158 It promotes workplace efficiency by
minimizing the government’s role in employment litigation. The
Supreme Court did not want to chill supervisors from terminating
incompetent or uncooperative employees out of fear that termination
would lead to a time consuming lawsuit.159 Suppose a police officer
expresses to her supervisor that his plan for allocating officers will
fail, and the supervisor immediately fires the officer for doubting
him.160 While termination in this case may be a petty managerial
decision, Garcetti over-protects the supervisor.161 Without Garcetti,
the supervisor might be forced to work with uncooperative officers out
156

See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
See id. at 1969-70 (Souter, J. dissenting).
158
See id. at 1958.
159
See id. at 1961.
160
See Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2006).
161
See id. at 648.
157
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of fear that termination could lead to a lawsuit. Garcetti over-protects
supervisors from retaliation for petty employment decisions so they
don’t need to justify every employment decision to a court.
There is no comparable need for over-protection in the education
context. While an employer may need to promote workplace
efficiency by removing uncooperative employees, school boards can
protect students by setting the curriculum and explaining it to
teachers.162 They should not be chilled from firing teachers for
inappropriate classroom expression because they can protect students
by first instructing teachers to remain on topic.163 If a teacher ignores
the school board and continues to expose children to inappropriate
material, the school board can fire the teacher for insubordination.164
Mayer also ignores key legal distinctions in Garcetti. The
Supreme Court stated that “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence
to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe
any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”165
This pronouncement is inappropriate in an academic context. In the
university setting, a political theory professor’s writings and speeches
may be made pursuant to official duties. Nonetheless, that professor
still has a First Amendment right to criticize the government.166 While
this argument is less persuasive for primary and secondary teachers,

162

See Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th
Cir. 1990).
163
This argument relies on the fact that almost all schools maintain conduct
guidelines. For example, the biology curriculum need not specify that the teacher
should not use profanity because this obvious rule is in the school’s code of conduct.
See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723-24 (8th
Cir. 1998) (finding that the school had given the teacher sufficient notice of
proscribed conduct by specifying conduct in the “Student Discipline Code,” among
other things).
164
See Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008.
165
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
166
See id. (Souter, J. dissenting) at 1969-70.
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the Seventh Circuit does not always distinguish between these two
settings.167
By applying Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit has given school
authorities an axe where a scalpel would be more appropriate. School
authorities may now remove any teacher without cause simply by
stating that classroom speech was the reason for removal.168 While this
axe may be used to protect impressionable children, it may also have
the undesirable effect of discouraging any teacher creativity or
spontaneity.169
Because Garcetti is not concerned with protecting students from
inappropriate material, it is completely inappropriate for teacher
classroom speech cases. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s language in
Garcetti is broad enough to apply in these cases.170 Because this case
is a natural extension of Pickering, most courts that apply Pickering
will probably adopt Garcetti for teacher classroom speech cases.
B. The Pickering Public Concern Test
Because Pickering dealt with substantially similar facts, it
presents the same difficulties as applying Garcetti to teacher
classroom speech. Nonetheless, four circuits have already decided to
apply Pickering in this setting.171 Unfortunately, only the Fourth

167

See Julia R. Lissner, Stop the Presses! Seventh Circuit Censors College
Student Media, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 182, 182-83 (2006), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-1/lissner.pdf.
168
See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477,
479 (7th Cir. 2007).
169
See Weiner, supra note 150, at 600.
170
See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
171
Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001);
Boring v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998); Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 797 (5th Cir. 1989); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d
1169, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Circuit has acknowledged the circuit split and offered reasons for its
decision to apply Pickering.172
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Boring v. Buncombe involved a
drama teacher who was punished for producing a school play that
violated the school’s controversial materials policy.173 The court
categorically denied protection to official teacher speech. The Boring
majority explained that its primary concern was to ensure that the
school board, not teachers, controlled the curriculum.174 The court
applied Pickering because it specifically dealt with public employee
speech, while Hazelwood dealt with student speech.175 In addition,
Hazelwood would force courts to make curricular decisions which
should rest with the school board.176 The court worried that teachers
could harass school officials by requiring them to justify every
curricular decision in court. This result would be un-democratic
because each judge would have a different opinion about what a
legitimate pedagogical concern is.177 This argument is not specific to
Hazelwood because school boards may be equally burdened by
arguing that a teacher’s speech is not a matter of public concern.178
The Pickering test is inappropriate in a school setting because it
focuses on the wrong elements. The “public concern” element is ill
suited for teacher classroom speech.179 This speech is neither ordinary
workplace speech, nor public debate. It is not difficult to imagine such
a test casting a “pall of orthodoxy over the classroom”180 such that a
teacher may only discuss well known issues or opinions. The
“workplace efficiency” element is also inappropriate because it
172

See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.

1998).
173

Id. at 366-67.
Id. 370-71.
175
See id. at 373 (Luttig, J. dissenting).
176
Id.
177
Id. at 371 (Wilkinson, J. concurring).
178
See id. at 378-79 (Motz, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County
Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001).
179
See Boring, 136 F.3d at 378 (Motz, J. dissenting).
180
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
174
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focuses on the effect of the speech on fellow teachers rather than
students.181 For example, because drug legalization is a hotly debated
topic it is certainly a matter of public concern. If an elementary school
teacher raises this topic in class it should not prevent other teachers
from teaching their students. Accordingly, under Pickering a teacher
may discuss the merits of drug legalization in an elementary school
class.182 The Pickering test was simply not designed for teacher
classroom speech because it does not account for the fact that
classroom speech involves young students.183
If the Seventh Circuit had applied Pickering, it would have likely
concluded that Mayer’s speech was protected. It would have to
conclude that the war in Iraq is a matter of public concern.184 It would
next have to apply the Pickering balancing test, which weighs Mayer’s
free speech interest against the school’s interest as an employer.185
Because the school board did not bring forth any evidence that
Mayer’s comments hurt teacher efficiency or the workplace
environment, the court would be hard pressed to rule that Mayer’s
speech was not protected.

181

See Boring, 136 F.3d at 378 (Motz, J. dissenting).
See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1051.
183
See Daly, supra note 3, at 52; Emily Holmes Davis, Note and Recent
Development, Protecting the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The First Amendment and
Public School Teachers' Classroom Speech, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 335, 361-64
(2005); Piggee v. Sandburg, 464 F.3d 667, 672 (2006).
184
The parties agreed as much. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp
(Mayer I), 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-VSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *33 (S.D.
Ind. Mar. 10, 2006).
185
The district court avoided this step by ignoring the “public concern” part of
the Pickering test, and ruling that Mayer was speaking as a public employee, rather
than a private citizen. Id. at *39.
182
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C. The Hazelwood Legitimate Pedagogical Concern Test
Four circuits apply Hazelwood to teacher classroom speech.186
Unfortunately, none offers reasons for this preference. Although
Hazelwood dealt with student speech, it is the Supreme Court’s most
recent case dealing with classroom speech. 187 Unlike Pickering, it
accounts for school boards’ needs to protect students from
inappropriate material.188
Under Hazelwood, a school could prevent a student from
expressing disapproval of the war in Iraq if it had a legitimate
pedagogical reason.189 The Supreme Court designed this test to
balance the speaker’s right to self expression against the school’s need
to protect students from speech “inconsistent with ‘the shared values
of a civilized social order.’”190 When a teacher speaks in the classroom
the same conflict of interests arises.191
The Fourth Circuit has criticized courts applying Hazelwood to
teacher classroom speech because these courts force judges to monitor
school board decisions.192 This result is un-democratic because judges
must determine what a “pedagogical concern” is rather than the school
board.193 The Fourth Circuit’s argument ignores the fact that courts
already monitor school board decisions. In Hazelwood, the Supreme
186

See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719,
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991).
187
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-274 (1988).
188
See Kuhn, supra note 61, at 1014 (asserting that Courts apply Hazelwood to
teacher classroom speech because it better recognizes the interests of the state as
educator, while Pickering focuses on the state as employer).
189
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
190
Id. at 272 (citing Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
191
See Kuhn, supra note 61, at 1014-15 (explaining why the Hazelwood test is
an appropriate test for teacher classroom speech).
192
See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 371 (4th Cir.
1998) (Wilkinson, J. concurring).
193
See id.
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Court rejected the argument that courts can never interfere with school
boards’ curricular decisions; a school board must justify any curricular
decision with some legitimate pedagogical reason.194 It should not
matter if a curricular decision is challenged by a student or a teacher.
The Supreme Court was likely motivated by the belief that unbounded
discretion to school boards is far more dangerous than occasionally
forcing schools to justify curricular decisions.195
Suppose a school board decided that all teachers must teach
creation science rather than evolution, and it fired a teacher and
expelled a student for discussing evolution in the classroom.196 The
teacher and student sue. In this case, the Fourth Circuit would reach a
bizarre result. It would invalidate the school board’s curricular
decision because it violated the Establishment clause,197 and would
reinstate the student because the school board violated his First
Amendment right to expression.198 Nonetheless, it would uphold the
school board’s decision to fire the teacher because it would be undemocratic to monitor school board decisions.199 There is no
principled reason for not applying Hazelwood uniformly and avoiding
this bizarre result.
Under Hazelwood, the Seventh Circuit would probably conclude
that the school board violated Mayer’s rights. The court would
probably explain that a school board may prevent teachers from
expressing political opinions in the classroom because the Supreme
Court has stated that schools may refuse to sponsor speech that
“associate[s] the school with any position other than neutrality on
matters of political concern.”200 The Seventh Circuit has interpreted
194

See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
See id. (explaining that although educators, not judges, should educate the
nation’s youth, courts may still need to intervene to protect First Amendment rights).
196
This hypothetical is based on Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
197
See id. at 596-97.
198
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
199
See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 371 (4th Cir.
1998) (Wilkinson, J. concurring).
200
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
195
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this language to mean that a school can maintain neutrality by
censoring controversial viewpoints in school-sponsored speech.201
Nonetheless, because there is no evidence that the school board gave
Mayer prior notice that she could not express her opinion, it could not
fire her. If she had later expressed a similar controversial opinion the
school board could have fired her.
D. Distinguishing Piggee
The Mayer Court could have decided not to distinguish Piggee.202
The court based its distinction on the fact that Piggee was not hired to
preach against homosexuality, but Mayer was hired to discuss current
events.203 While this distinction is factually accurate, giving it legal
significance leads to bizarre results.
Because Mayer expressed her disapproval of the war in Iraq
during a current events class, her speech is categorically
unprotected.204 Suppose Mayer had expressed her opinion during math
class. Since Mayer’s opinion was outside the scope of her duty to
teach math, her speech would not be categorically unprotected.205 The
court would have to apply the Piggee test: the school could punish her
only if her opinion was “nongermane” speech that “impede[d] the
school’s educational mission.”206 Because her comments were very
brief and not overbearing, a court might conclude that her speech
should be protected.207 This result would be especially bizarre if
Mayer actually taught both classes—she could opine on the war in the
morning during math class, but she will be fired if she opines on the
201

See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir.
1996) (explaining that schools can suppress some viewpoints).
202
Piggee v. Sandburg, 464 F.3d 667 (2006).
203
Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 480
(7th Cir. 2007).
204
See id.
205
See id. at 480 (explaining that Garcetti did not apply in Piggee because the
teacher was discussing an unassigned topic).
206
See Piggee, 464 F.3d at 672.
207
See id.
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war in the afternoon during current events class. The court could have
avoided this situation if it had consistently applied either the Piggee or
Hazelwood test, i.e. explain that the school must provide a legitimate
pedagogical reason for firing Mayer regardless of whether the speech
occurred in math class or current events class.
E. Other Tests
Commentators have offered several different tests which the
Mayer could have applied. While these tests have less support from
case law, there may be policy reasons for adopting one of these tests.
Walter Kuhn has proposed a hybrid Pickering/Hazelwood test that
is designed to maximize protection afforded to teachers.208
Restrictions on process are evaluated under Hazelwood, and
restrictions on content are evaluated under Pickering.209 For example,
Mayer’s decision to discuss the war in Iraq was a content based
decision so the school can only punish her for the speech if it does not
touch on a matter of public concern. Since the war in Iraq is a matter
of public concern, the school could not punish the speech. Mayer’s
structuring of the class consists of process decisions which the school
may punish if it has a legitimate pedagogical reason. Kuhn’s test has
two main problems: the distinction between content and process
restrictions is frequently vague,210 and it is far too deferential too
teachers. If the Seventh Circuit adopted the test, it would have to
reverse Webster and rule that teachers may refuse to teach content
specified in the curriculum so long as they discuss other content which
touches upon matters of public concern.211
Karen Daly has proposed a more moderate mixed proceduralsubstantive test which accounts for the amount of notice school boards

208

See Kuhn, supra note 61, at 1020-21.
Id.
210
Id. at 1023.
211
See Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th
Cir. 1990).
209
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provide to teachers.212 When a school has explicitly prohibited specific
speech, the teacher has no protected right to engage in that speech.
When a school has explicitly authorized specific speech, the teacher is
immunized from action. In the great majority of cases where notice is
ambiguous, courts should apply a modified Hazelwood test.213
When a reasonable teacher should have known that the school
board has prohibited certain speech, courts should presume that the
school board has a legitimate pedagogical reason for prohibiting the
speech.214 When a reasonable teacher would expect certain speech to
be protected, the judicial presumption would shift in favor of the
teacher. The school can rebut this presumption by presenting evidence
that the speech had no educational purpose, or had a detrimental effect
on students’ Constitutional rights.215 This test might also be too
deferential to teachers. By categorically protecting approved teacher
speech this test prevents school boards from re-evaluating decisions.
V. WHY MAYER SHOULD HAVE APPLIED HAZELWOOD
Under Mayer, public schools now have carte blanche to fire any
teacher who expresses an unpopular opinion.216 This is a very
powerful tool for protecting children from inappropriate material.
Unfortunately, this tool is unnecessary and creates numerous practical
problems.217
The court applied Garcetti because it wanted to ensure that school
boards, not teachers or judges, make decisions about the school
curriculum. However, this concern does not justify a per se rule that
teacher classroom speech is unprotected. If the school had also
suspended a student for discussing the war in Iraq in class, the court
212

See Daly, supra note 3, at 53-54.
Id. at 54-55.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477,
480 (7th Cir. 2007).
217
See supra sec. III.
213

793
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/12

32

Nemunaitis: <em>Mayer v. Monroe</em>: The Seventh Circuit Sheds Freedom of Sp

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

would evaluate whether this constraint on student speech is justified
under Hazelwood, i.e. a judge would evaluate whether the school
board had a legitimate pedagogical reason for censoring discussion of
the war in Iraq.218 Thus, Mayer provides no added immunity to school
boards, it just encourages students to challenge school board decisions
rather than teachers.219 The Seventh Circuit has created no benefit for
school boards, but it has created numerous problems for teachers,
students, and schools as outlined above in Section III.
Because Garcetti and Pickering dealt with significantly different
concerns, the Seventh Circuit should not have applied that line of
cases in Mayer. The court should have maintained its earlier
distinction between teacher employee speech which is evaluated under
the Pickering line,220 and teacher classroom speech which is evaluated
under Hazelwood.221
This approach avoids the numerous problems created by a per se
rule against protecting classroom speech.222 In addition, the
Hazelwood test more appropriately balances parents’ interests in
protecting students from inappropriate material, and teachers’ interests
in protecting their First Amendment rights.223 Although it may import
some judicial oversight into school boards’ curricular decisions, the
modest requirements of the test should not be burdensome.
Furthermore, the court should consider the amount of notice
provided to teachers regarding prohibited speech.224 While there is
218

See note 196 and accompanying text.
The next case in this line may be brought by a student claiming a First
Amendment right to hear from and discuss with a teacher. See Daly, supra note 3, at
31 (discussing the concept of a student’s right to hear).
220
See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F. 3d 878 (7th Cir. 2003); Dishnow v. Sch. Dist.
of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194 (7th Cir. 1996).
221
Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
1990).
222
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
223
See Daly, supra note 3, at 53.
224
See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723 (8th
Cir. 1998); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Daly, supra note 3, at
53.
219
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little case law to support Karen Daly’s shifting presumption test,
courts should consider notice when evaluating schools’ pedagogical
concerns.225 Some notice to teachers is prima facie evidence that the
school does in fact have a legitimate pedagogical interest in censoring
the speech. When the school retaliates without any prior notice, as in
Mayer’s case, the school will probably have a more difficult time
explaining its pedagogical interest.
Under this approach, the court should have remanded the case to
the trial court to determine if the school had a legitimate pedagogical
interest in terminating Mayer. While the school may have strong
arguments to support its decision, the Seventh Circuit should require
the school to explain them in court. Mayer and her students are at least
entitled to know why the short classroom discussion was so devious
that it rendered Mayer unfit for teaching.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has overruled the balance struck in Webster v.
New Lenox between a teacher’s rights and a school board’s power to
control the curriculum. While its opinion is literally consistent with
Garcetti v. Ceballos, it completely ignores the fact that discussions
between teachers and students are very different from discussions
between fellow employees. Mayer v. Monroe is so deferential to
school boards that few teachers will even attempt to challenge school
board decisions in the future. Thus, the Seventh Circuit will probably
not have an opportunity to revisit this decision any time soon. In the
meantime, teachers in the Seventh Circuit will have to shed the
freedom of speech at the classroom door.

225

See Daly, supra note 3, at 53.
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